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 1 
PREAMBLE 
 
The forthcoming Industry Commission inquiry into "charitable organisations" is not the first 
inquiry into regulation of charity. The English have been conducting charity inquiries since 1597 
and the Americans since the turn of the century. In comparison there have been few direct 
inquiries in either Australia or New Zealand concerning the regulation of charities. This paper 
seeks to examine some themes of regulation from primary sources and also to be informed from 
less prolific secondary sources. 
 
The primary policy documents consist of state and industry sponsored inquiries into charity 
regulation in Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom and America. The English jurisdiction 
provides the most important source of inquiry literature. This jurisdiction spawned the concept 
of the charitable trust and developed administrative practices.1
 
 The secondary literature  sources 
concern the attempted quantification of the regulatory default of charities and their supervision. 
This empirical literature originates in academic work, but also includes infrequent empirical 
studies by government and industry inquiries. 
The paper reveals that regulatory failure, often chronic, has characterised the regulatory 
environments of charities across time and locale. The analysis of the primary literature identifies 
common issues and suggested remedies pertaining to the regulatory failures of charities. These 
issues may well be appropriate for consideration by the commission and participants given their 
persistence in various inquiries for nearly four centuries. Such inquiries also considered other 
issues not directly referred to in this paper, to also include them would exponentially increase the 
already unwieldy size of this paper.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The English regulation of charity differs from that adopted on the Continent and other 
jurisdictions that do not have an English legal inheritance. Those jurisdictions with an English 
legal inheritance have generally adopted the legal notion of charity. Thus in Australia, New 
Zealand and the United States of America similar legal and administrative roots exist. Each has 
developed variations on the English regulatory assumptions, but none have strayed too far from 
the original orientation. 
 
                                                     
1  It is conceded that the origins of the trust are not English as Maitland would have us believe (F.W. Maitland, `The 
Origin of Uses', Harvard Law Review, Vol.8, No.3, 1894, pp.127-137), but subsequent development is entirely 
English. There is strong evidence of Roman, Teutonic and even Islamic roots for the concept. Refer A. Van Wynen 
Thomas, `Note on the Origin of Uses and Trusts - Waqfs', South Western Law Journal, Vol.3, 1949, pp.162-166; 
B.F. Brown, `The Ecclesiastical Origin of the Use', Notre Dame Lawyer, Vol.10, 1934-5, pp.353-366; G. Makdisi, 
`Legal History of Islamic Law and The English Common Law: Origins and Metamorphoses', Cleveland State Law 
Journal, Vol.34, No.3, pp.3-18; M.M. Gaudiosi, `The Influence of the Islamic Law of Waqf on the Development of 
the Trust in England: The Case of Merton College', University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol.136, pp.1231-
1261. 
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All four jurisdictions have sponsored inquiries concerning the regulation of charities. Some of 
these have had the status of royal commissions, others have been flimsy reports of the Law 
Reform Commissions staffed part time by respective judiciaries, while other committees have 
been convened by peak charity interest groups. While all of these inquiries provide primary 
policy documentation about the regulation of charities, few contain empirical measures of 
compliance or efficiency. Some inquiries claim that there is little abuse of charities,2 others that 
there is substantial abuse,3
 
 with little empirical basis often for either of these conclusions.  Even 
in other literature, there is sparse empirical data available on the propensity of charities to be 
used to perpetrate frauds, their compliance with their own constitutional provisions or the law 
and the effectiveness of state administrative scrutiny.  
General charity statistics in all the discussed jurisdictions are far from enlightening compared to 
for-profit entity data,4
 
 so it not surprising that fraud and compliance statistics are any different. 
Recent scholarship is beginning to fill in this gap and the preliminary evidence is tending 
towards a propensity for regulatory failure greater than for profit enterprises. These secondary 
sources of empirical analysis are examined for indications that there exists regulatory failure of 
charities to comply with the law and charity regulators to enforce and monitor charities in 
accordance with the law. 
Analysis of these primary policy documents combined with secondary empirical sources on 
compliance of charities provides a method of teasing out matters pertinent to the regulation of 
charity and establishing the phenomena of the regulatory failure of charities. These primary 
policy documents provide the richest record of assessments of the effectiveness of charity 
regulation and proposed solutions to correct inappropriate behaviours and enhance the 
effectiveness of charities. 
 
It is the a contention that the law has constrained the public policy process in developing more 
appropriate forms of regulation of charities. This can be appreciated most graphically by the way 
in which inquiries have grappled with the definition of what falls within the boundaries of 
charity. Such constraints are also evident in the way in which frustration of the purposes of 
                                                     
2  For example see, NCSS Committee of Inquiry into the Effect of Charity Law and Practice on Voluntary 
Organisations, National Council of Social Service, London, 1976; J. Wolfenden, The Future of Voluntary 
Organisations, Croom Helm, London, 1978; Property Law and Equity Reform Committee, Report on the Charitable 
Trusts Act, 1957, Department of Justice, Wellington, 1979. 
3  House of Representatives, Special Committee to Investigate Foundations and Comparable Organisations, 83rd 
Congress, 2nd Session, House Report No. 2681; State regulation of Charitable Trusts and Solicitations, The National 
Association of Attorneys General, Committee on the Office of Attorney General, Washington, 1977; Monitoring and 
Control of Charities in England and Wales, National Audit Office, HMSO, London, 1987. 
4  M. Lyons, Nonprofit Organisations in Australia: What do we know and what should we find out next?, Working 
Paper No.1, Program on Nonprofit Corporations, Queensland University of Technology, 1991; M. Lyons & J. 
Polkington, Data Sources for Research on Private Not-For-Profit Organisations in Australia, Working Paper No.9, 
Centre for Australian Community Organisations and Management, University of Technology, Sydney, 1992. 
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perpetual charitable entities are rectified and the form and location of the regulatory provisions. 
These matters will all be examined by this paper in the context of their identification, 
substantiation and proposed rectification by inquiries. 
 
No inquiry has seriously addressed the possibility of shifting to a new paradigm that is regarded 
as more appropriate to the functions that charities are established to perform. It is contended 
elsewhere that inappropriate models of regulation have been adopted and perpetuated, 
contributing to the systemic and intractable regulatory failure of charities. This paper seeks to 
open the debate on these issues, but the proposed solutions are for future papers.  
 
The largest primary literature is found in the English jurisdiction, beginning in the reign of 
Elizabeth I to the recent White Paper in 1991. Because of the primacy of the English jurisdiction 
as the basis of all other charity jurisdictions and the extensive primary literature, the paper will 
deal exhaustively with all the English primary material. Then, the less extensive American, 
Australian and New Zealand primary material will be examined in the light of such English 
material for unique variations and common themes.  
 
One theme arising from the inquiries is reserved for special mention after this initial survey. It is 
the problem associated with the legal definition of charity. The definition of charity receives 
attention from English, New Zealand and Australian inquiries and reveals some important 
relationships between law and charity policy. The confused state of the definitions of charity are 
a major impediment to effective charity regulation. 
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ENGLAND 
 
The legal institution of the charitable trust was fashioned in three centuries of English history 
and then adopted by its former colonies. This section chronicles the inquiries concerning the 
regulation of the institution of charity from the turn of the seventeenth century to the beginning 
of the present decade. It examines the identified problems that the inquiries were to address, the 
quantification of such problems and the solutions recommended by the inquiries. The problems 
revolve consistently  around the reconstruction of dormant trusts, the failure of judicial and 
administrative procedures to provide efficient charity reconstruction, the boundaries of the 
definition of charity and the general failure of charity administrators to supervise charities and 
charities to comply with regulatory provisions. The quantification of the perceived problems is 
sparse until the inquiries of the last two decades. There is more evidence to indicate continuous 
substantial default than undetected compliance. The inquiries have suggested solutions to these 
problems that have been fairly consistent and incremental since the seventeenth century, with 
certain legal tenets, such as the definition of charity resisting any suggested substantial alteration. 
 
The Statute of Charitable Uses of 16015 was passed as part of a package of reforms6 to deal with 
the economic and social problems of the time, which became known as the Poor Law.7
 
 It was a 
time when the hold of the Church on charity was broken and  
 the objects of charity were to become more secular as the majority of Englishmen 
reflected less on their souls and became more concerned with the worldly needs of 
their fellow man.8
 
 
The statute provided a new method of regulating charities rather than through the judiciary.9
                                                     
5  43rd Eliz, Cap. 4.; this act is a modification of a prior Statute of Uses in 1597, 39 Eliz, cap. 6. 
 It 
sought to ensure that funds did not become dormant or misused. The Chancellor and later the 
Office of the Attorney-General as parens patriae was responsible on behalf of the Crown for 
6  43 Eliz, cap. 2, dealt with such issues as declaring all beggars who requested anything but food rogues, made 
parents and grandparents liable for the maintenance of children or grandchildren; 43 Eliz, cap. 3, dealt with the 
provision of pensions to maimed soldiers from local taxes. 
7  There was at the time a series of disastrous harvests, the protracted Spanish war, inflation, a domestic and 
international economic depression and the plague which killed 14 per cent of the population of London. This led to 
rapidly changing social conditions causing poverty, unemployment and vagrancy. The laws initiated by Henry VIII 
comprised of local rate levies which were distributed by local authorities to the deserving poor or creating work. 
8  G. Jones, History of the Law of Charity 1532-1827, Wm. W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc., Holmes Beach, Florida, 1986, at 
p.10; also similar conclusions are expressed in E.M. Leonard, The Early History of the English Poor Relief, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1900, at p.9. 
9  B.K. Gray, A History of Philanthropy: From the Dissolution of the Monasteries to the Taking of the First Census, 
Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, London, 1967 at p.35; W.K. Jordan, Philanthropy in England 1480-1660: A Study of the 
Changing Pattern of English Social Aspirations, George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London, 1958 at p.83; G. Jones, 
History of the Law of Charity: 1532-1827, Wm. W. Guant & Sons Inc, Florida, 1986, at p.16. 
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protecting charitable trusts and had sole standing to initiate actions against charitable trusts.10 
While in Thomas Moore's day the Chancellor and the Court of Equity that had supervision over 
charity were a cheap and speedy remedy for the abuses and failures of charitable trusts by the 
time of the reign of Elizabeth the delays, expense and technical complexities put the justice of 
the court of equity out of the reach of all except the very wealthy.11
 
 This situation still largely 
exists in England and its former colonies to this day. 
The Act provided for Commissioners to hear complaints against charitable trustees breaching the 
terms of the trust with an appeal to the Chancellor. Commissioners were usually the Bishop 
(Ordinary), Chancellor of the diocese and other persons of "good and sound character". They had 
the power to order the rectification of defaults by trustees or others and cure defective gifts to 
charitable trusts. The Act set out the purposes of trusts over which the Commissioners had 
jurisdiction and so began the definition of charity that is the origin of present definition. 
 
The problem of poverty was partly perceived as the inefficiency of charity to provide for such 
matters as relief to the poor and public infrastructure. The motivation to tackle the problem was 
the rapidly changing social conditions and a depressed economy; and part of the solution was to 
provide an administrative scrutiny of private charitable funds. The judiciary was relegated to an 
appellant court role, regulation being assumed by an administrative agency. 
 
In the initial years after the Act there were many commissions appointed, which had substantial 
success in detecting abuses and dormant trusts. Forty-five decrees were issued in the first year of 
the Act12 and over a thousand decrees were sealed before the death of King James.13 These 
gradually waned, until in Wales the last commission was held in the reign of Queen Anne and in 
England, ended in 1803.14
 
 Although there is no accurate empirical material on the size of 
English charities at that time, the decrees indicate a deal of charitable default. 
Attempts to create the first registry of charities to replace the defunct roving commissions were 
instigated in the late eighteenth century. Again the judicial system through the equity courts 
caused expense, delays and technicalities preventing any practical remedy to abuse of charities. 
Sir Samuel Romilly noted in a Parliamentary debate at the time that, 
 
                                                     
10  The doctrine of parens patriae is the inherent power and authority of the state to provide protection of non sui 
juris persons such as children, the insane and incompetent persons. The monarch was regarded as "father of his 
country". 
11  Jones, op.cit., at p.20. 
12  B.K. Gray, A History of English Philanthropy, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., London, 1967 at p.38. 
13  Jones, op. cit., at p.52. 
14  Great Britain, Report of the Committee on the Law and Practice relating to Charitable Trusts, Cmd. 8710, 
HMSO, London, 1952, at p.18. 
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 continuance of these abuses did not proceed from ignorance of the nature of the 
charitable institutions, for the nature of the institutions and the abuses committed 
with respect to them, were notorious; but from the difficult and expensive nature of 
the remedy provided by the law.15
 
 
An Act sponsored by Romilly was passed to address such delays by providing for a summary 
form of redress by justices against abuses of charitable trusts.16 The House of Lords in a series of 
cases so strictly confined the provisions of the Act because of its disapproval of dealing with 
such matters summarily, that its application fell into disuse.17
 
  
It was also a time of economic reform of government with the establishment of Commissions of 
Inquiry into Public Accounts that were staffed by financial experts rather than politicians on 
witch hunts.18 This led to many reforms of government administration such as audits, specific 
duties for offices of the state, end of sinecures and the substitution of salaries for fees and 
gratuities.19 In this environment, Gilbert's Act20 decreed that charities benefiting the poor were 
to lodge returns sworn on the oath to Parliament. This Act was the result of a nine year campaign 
by a poor law reformer, Thomas Gilbert whose bills were constantly defeated in the House of 
Lords.21 The Lords found the provisions of the Bill were a gross infringement of liberties and an 
imposition on charitable trusts. Although the Act provided for a fine for default, it did not 
include charities created after the Act and did not require subsequent returns. Gray notes that it 
was "honoured more in breach than observance"22 and Thompson that, "the outcome must have 
been a disappointment, for nothing was done with the returns."23
 
  
The Charitable Donations Act, 181224
                                                     
15  Quoted in G. Jones, op. cit., at p.165, from Memoirs of the Life of Samuel Romilly, London, Samuel Romilly, 
1840, pp.385-6. 
 required the registration of charitable trusts with the 
16  52 Geo. III c.101. 
17  Re Matter of Bedford Charity (1819) 2 Swanst. 470; Attorney-General v. Green (1820) 1 Jac & W 303; Re 
Lawford Charity, ex parte Skinner (1817) 2 Mer 453. 
18  J.E.D Binney, British Public Finance and Administration, 1774-1792, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1958; 20 Geo. 
III c.54. 
19  R.T. Thompson, The Charity Commission and the Age of Reform, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1979, at 
p.52. 
20  Returns of Charitable Donations Act, 1786 (26 Geo. III c.58). 
21  1877 Commons Journal, XXXVI, 309, 420, 525. 
22  D. Owen, English Philanthropy, 1660-1960, The Belknap Press of Harvard University, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1964, at p.183. 
23  Thompson, op. cit., at pp.83-84. 
24  52 Geo. III c.102. 
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Chancery Inrolment Office. In the first year of operation there were just over four hundred 
registrations and by 1829, six hundred and ninety-six registrations. The lack of returns was 
ascribed to lack of enforcement and wide exemptions from registration.25 The Act remained 
unheeded on the Statute books until it was repealed by the Charities Act in 1960.26
 
 Both these 
acts were attempts to investigate and reform charities in England by scrutiny of financial returns 
at a central registry, but failed because of defective administrative procedures. 
The Benthamite utilitarians of the early nineteenth century were measuring the "efficiency and 
effectiveness" of many institutions of British society. The Brougham Inquiry 1819-1837 was one 
of their amazing royal commissions that has no rivals in charity commissions and very few in 
any other royal commission at that time or since.27 The inquiry grew out of a select 
parliamentary committee into the provision of education, which highlighted the abuse some 
educational institutions made of charitable donations.28
 
  
The Brougham Inquiry lasted for nearly two decades, cost nearly four million pounds, producing 
forty volumes of reports and digests, comprising more than thirty-eight thousand pages and 
encompassing over twenty-nine thousand charities.29 It is estimated that it conservatively 
recovered over thirteen million pounds in assets that were being misused or under utilised with 
four hundred charities being prosecuted by the Attorney General.30 The Inquiry found in 
approximately twenty-five per cent of the cases some major cause to criticise the management of 
the trust.31
 
 This only included the worst of the abuses as Owen notes,  
 Although the trustees were observing the terms of their trust the Commissioners 
could not object, however useless or even vicious they may have considered the 
charity, sometimes the provisions of a trust were stretched beyond the limits of 
legality.32
                                                     
25  R.T. Thompson, op. cit., at p.91, where substantial charities such as Eton School, Cambridge University, Oxford 
University and their colleges were exempted from the Act. 
 
26  The Charities Act (U.K., 1960), Fifth Schedule. 
27  Although referred to as the Borougham Inquiry, it was really two inquiries, the Inquiry of the Commissioners on 
the Education of the Poor, 1818 and the Inquiry of the Commissioners on Charity, 1819. 
28  Great Britain, Select Committee on the Education of the Poor in the Metropolis, Hansard, XXXIV, 1816. 
29  B. Hargraves, The Reform of the Law and Administration of Charities in the Nineteenth Century, Unpublished 
doctoral thesis No.167, University of London, 1969 at p.11. 
30  R. Thompson, op. cit., at p.182; the ability of the Commission to refer charities to the Attorney General was very 
limited and the figure does not represent accurately the extent of the abuses of charitable trusts. Informal pressure of 
investigation and publicity served to remedy many other specific abuses of charities. 
31  Hargrave, op. cit., at p.191. 
32  Owen, op. cit., at p.195. 
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The Commission employed legal staff to travel England categorising and investigating all 
charities, making regular reports on abuses and schemes to reform charitable trusts. The 
Commission had been effective at seeking out charitable abuse, reforming charities were 
possible and referring serious cases to the Attorney-General to be dealt with by the judiciary. 
The Attorney General and the judiciary had been largely circumvented by a specialist 
administrative agencies which actively pursued their mission with fairly adequate resources. The 
Commission's work resulted in the Charitable Trusts Act of 185333 that was amended in 185534 
and 186035
 
 to establish a permanent Commission to administer charity supervision.  
The Charity Commission investigated charities and recommended reform of individual charities 
to the Attorney General who sought the approval of Parliament. This proved slower and more 
expensive than the Courts of Equity and in 1860 the power to devise schemes was given to the 
Commission sharing concurrent jurisdiction with the court of equity.36
 
  
For the next century little investigatory work was commenced apart from the work of the now 
permanent Charity Commissioner, which will be seen to be less than thorough. The twentieth 
century was almost half gone before Lord Beveridge in 1948 was financed by English nonprofit 
organisations to write a report entitled, Voluntary Action: A Report on Methods of Social 
Advance.37 It was a time after the Second World War of social change and increasing 
government provision of welfare services. He called for the establishment of a Royal 
Commission to examine charitable trusts and particularly their response to changing 
circumstances, which is a review of the doctrine of cy pres.38
 
 After this report was published 
there was agitation for a royal commission relating to charities and in January 1950 a committee 
of inquiry was appointed under the leadership of Lord Nathan. 
The Report of the Committee on the Law and Practice Relating to Charitable Trusts (known as 
the Nathan Report) in 1952 was a substantial governmental inquiry into English charities and 
their regulation.39
                                                     
33  16 & 17 Vic. c.137 
 The report's introduction acknowledged that its appointment was due to the 
Beveridge report and the concern that, 
34  18 & 19 Vic. c.124. 
35  23 & 24 Vic. c.136. 
36  Charities Act of 1860. 
37  Lord Beveridge, Voluntary Action: A Report on Methods of Social Advance, 1948, London; funded by the 
Nuffield Foundation and National Deposit Friendly Society. 
38  Ibid., at p.310. 
39  Great Britain, Report of the Committee on the Law and Practice relating to Charitable Trusts, Cmd. 8710, 
HMSO, London, 1952, hereinafter referred to as the "Nathan Report". 
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 ... financial difficulties have led to a widely-felt need to obtain the greatest 
advantage from the funds available and to adjust and develop the relationship 
between voluntary action and the government and local public authorities.40
 
 
The law and particularly the doctrine of cy pres had remained unchanged since 1860.41 It found 
the provision for recording trusts was disregarded and was a "dead letter".42 "Hundreds, perhaps 
thousands of trusts need revision"43 according to its estimates. Less than one third of the very 
incomplete registration of charitable trusts had submitted accounts, the Committee believing that 
the reasons for this were a shortage of Commission staff, trustee ignorance and lack of a specific 
penalty for nonlodgement.44 The pace of social and economic change had again diminished the 
effectiveness of supervision of and therefore the effectiveness of charitable trusts, and the 
doctrine of cy pres was again failing to reform trusts.45
 
 
The Commission found that the powers exercised by the Charity Commission were wide enough 
and no further powers were necessary.46 Its solution was to concentrate on regulatory matters 
discussed above to more easily bring appropriate candidates for reform to the attention of the 
Commission.47 Trusts were to be recorded by the Charity Commission and such records were to 
be made available for public inspection.48
 
  
The Nathan Committee was informed by the Chief Charity Commissioner that, "trusts are now 
almost without exception honestly administered",49 the Attorney General gave evidence that 
there was "not more than half a dozen cases a year, of which half came from the public and 
usually concerned small matters such as disagreements between trustees."50
                                                     
40  Ibid., at p.1. 
 Although they were 
41  Cy prés is a term of French origins, "cy pré comme", "cy" being this and "prés" being near, or near to it. It was a 
process developed by the English equitable judiciary to remedy frustrating events that a perpetual charity may 
encounter such as impracticability of charitable purpose, inadequacy or surplus of funds. The judiciary attempted to 
apply the frustrated funds to a purpose as near as possible to the original purpose and intention of the donor. 
42  Nathan, op. cit., p.37. 
43  Ibid., at p.27. 
44  Ibid., at p.46. 
45  Ibid., at pp.26-27. 
46  Ibid., at p.48. 
47  See text accompanying footnote ? above. 
48  Ibid., at p.41. 
49  Ibid., at p.47. 
50  Ibid., at p.47. 
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presented with little evidence of abuse of charities, they recommended that accounts be audited, 
with standard form of financial accounts, sanction for failure to lodge accounts, a random 
scrutiny of accounts lodged and expanded powers for Charity Commission investigation.51 The 
report also recommended the repeal of many outmoded statutes such as the law of mortmain52 
and the Charitable Donations Act.53
 
  
The White Paper following the report proposed a completely revised Charities Act adopting 
Nathan recommendations such as a relaxed definition of cy pres and most of the other 
recommendations such as lodging annual returns of charities.54
 
 A notable exception that was to 
be blamed later for the ineffectiveness of parts of the regulatory measures of the Charities Act 
1960 was, 
 Probably any reform of the Charity Commissioners and the Ministry would need 
more staff. In present times it is not easy to envisage a large increase of staff in any 
office, and this must be a factor in determining the pace at which reforms can be 
carried out. But it is plain that, to the extent that a new task is undertaken, staff must 
be provided to carry it out."55
 
 
The Act refined the scrutiny of charities by an administrative body with greater powers of 
inspection, rectification of failing trusts and the supposed creation of a central data bank of 
charity activity. The Nathan Report again illustrated the themes of an unresponsive Attorney 
General and judiciary. It also identified an administrative agency presided over a chaotic register 
with drastic reform needed to a large number of charities. There was no substantive measure of 
the size of the task. The Report in essence found an agency that was not performing effectively 
its expected task of regulating charities. 
 
Agitation of the welfare lobby about the place of voluntary action in the mid-seventies led to a 
series of reports on charity regulation, but these were not acted on by government. The Tenth 
Report of the Expenditure Committee, 1974-75 examined the Charity Commissioners and their 
accountability.56
                                                     
51  Ibid., at pp.51-52. 
 It cited as the reason for the investigation that there was public concern 
52  Mortmain is the name given to a series of laws which regulated perpetual corporations holding large tracts of 
feudal lands in perpetuity which had consequences for feudal imposts and wealth creation. Provisions dating from 
the Magna Carta in 1215 (c.43) are comprehensively listed in Part 2, Schedule 7 of the Charities Act (U.K. 1960). 
53  52 GEO. III, c.102. 
54  Great Britain, Government Policy on Charitable Trusts in England and Wales, Cmd.9538, HMSO, London, 
1955. 
55  Ibid., at p.10. 
56  Great Britain, The Tenth Report from the Expenditure Committee, 1974-75, Charity Commissioners and their 
Accountability, HMSO, London, 1975. 
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 that the effects of charity law and its administration were restricting the work and 
development of the voluntary movement".57
 
 
It found that there were delays with the Charity Commission registration procedures and default 
in checking charity financial returns, to which the Commission pleaded lack of resources and 
staff.58 The Royal Commission recommended that the register of charities should be 
computerised, standard financial reporting forms developed together with model trust deeds to 
guide new charities.59
 
 The report noted that there had been an  
 ossification of the law as a result of the scarcity of appeals to the High Court60
 
 
due to the high litigation costs that faced charitable trustees. Professor Sheridan although 
criticising the report, 
 
 As one would expect from a committee of politicians, the report is a mixture of 
naivete, suspicion, good intentions, silliness, sound common sense, straight 
speaking, bad grammar, caution and dogma61
 
 
noted that, 
 
 The most depressing part of the report is ... that charities rarely appeal against 
Commissioners' decisions because charities cannot afford the cost of litigation. Civil 
litigation in the High Court and above is expensive, is daunting to all but the rich 
and the aided and ought to be engaged in whenever there is a dispute within a 
jurisdiction only of superior courts. The courts can be stultified if, through lack of 
litigation, its concepts are not broadened (and refined) slowly down from precedent 
to precedent62
 
 
These complaints had been made continuously in inquiries since the Statute of Elizabeth, but 
now the Charity Commission as well was being accused of the same faults. The Committee 
heard evidence that the Charity Commission was being overly legalistic and inflexible in the 
                                                     
57  Ibid., at p.v. 
58  Ibid., at p.xxiv. 
59  Ibid., at p.xxviii. 
60  Ibid., at p.xxxi. 
61  L.A. Sheridan, `Waiting for Goodman', Anglo-American Law Review, Vol.5, 1976, pp.153-172 at p.153. 
62  Ibid., at p.165. 
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scheme making powers that they possessed.63 They recommended that local authorities be given 
powers to apply schemes to local charities which were small or obsolete.64
 
 This further 
delegation to an agency closer to the charities was the favoured solution rather than reform of the 
law. 
Shortly before the Tenth Report of the Expenditure Committee, the Goodman Committee had 
been convened by the National Council of Social Service as an inquiry into the effect of charity 
law and practice on voluntary organisations.65 They echoed the findings of the report of the 
Expenditure Committee but went further in recommending that small local charities be 
compulsorily amalgamated into neighbourhood trusts for the purposes of the welfare of the local 
community.66 They also recommended that the cy pres powers of the Commission should be 
streamlined and be able in appropriate cases to fundamentally alter the purpose of the trust.67
 
 
The Committee found that there was little or no scrutiny of prospective charity applications for 
registration as a charity.68 A survey of the UK Charity Commission in 1978 on 1975 charity 
accounts found less than twenty-five per cent had accounts lodged for that particular year.69 
Forty per cent had never lodged any accounts and of those that had lodged accounts over fifty 
per cent had not lodged accounts within the last five years.70 The Charities Aid Foundation in a 
1976 report found that thirty-eight percent of grant making trusts did not file accounts with the 
commission or make them available to the public in any other form.71
 
 The British Spastic 
Society claimed that its  
 research revealed that no less than 75 per cent (charities) had not filed accounts with 
the Commission during the last five years. Furthermore, some charities had not filed 
any accounts since incorporation.72
                                                     
63  Ibid., at p.xix. 
  
64  Ibid., at pxxi. 
65  NCSS Committee of Inquiry into the Effect of Charity Law and Practice on Voluntary Organisations, National 
Council of Social Service, London, 1976. 
66  Ibid., at p.92. 
67  Ibid., at p.95. 
68  Ibid., at p.68. 
69  M. Austin & J. Posnett, The Charity Sector in England and Wales - Characteristics and Public Accountability, 
Institute of Social and Economic Research, Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York, 
Reprint Series, No.281, 1980, at p.3. 
70  M. Austin and J. Posnett, `The Charity Sector in England and Wales - Characteristics and Public Accountability', 
National Westminster Bank Quarterly Review, August, 1979, pp.40-51, at p.44. 
71  Charities Aid Foundation, Report on Foundation Activity, 1976, London, at pp.6 & 21. 
72  T. Yeo, Public Accountability and Regulation of Charities, The Spastics Society, London, undated. 
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The Committee spent considerable time examining the definition of charity that will be referred 
to in the next section of this paper. The Wolfenden Committee was contemporaneously 
commissioned by other English charitable trusts "to review the role and functions of voluntary 
organisations in the United Kingdom over the next 25 years."73 The committee grappled with the 
place of voluntary organisations in an increasingly welfare orientated state. It endorsed the 
recommendations of the Goodman Committee, and concluded that, "... we do not believe that 
accountability is a real difficulty for the great majority of voluntary organisations."74
 
 
These post Nathan inquiries that drew little response from the Government again are illustrative 
of past themes. The notable exception is that empirical evidence is beginning to emerge that the 
Charity Commission registry was characterised by gross regulatory failure both on the part of 
charities complying with regulations and the commission in enforcing such requirements. The 
recourse to the judiciary is noted as infrequently occurring and this is identified as having a 
detrimental effect of the development of common law. The lack of interest by mainstream legal 
discourse is evidenced by the English Law Reform Committee in 1982 that only briefly touched 
on charitable trusts when they prepared a report on the powers and duties of trustees.75 It had 
few submissions from lawyers on charitable trusts and dealt only briefly with minor technical 
matters such as the retirement of a charity trustee, power of charity trustees to borrow and 
appointment of charity trustees by deed.76
 
 It was more concerned with the provision of 
appropriate trust structures to facilitate the use of the trust for private and commercial purposes. 
The later stages of the Thatcher Conservative Party Government spawned a series of inquiries 
that were to show again that the regulatory compliance and scrutiny of charities were grossly 
deficient. That government's policies driven by a different vision of the state's role in English 
society, accompanied by economic decline and social upheaval, provide a backdrop to an inquiry 
into charity regulation that bares remarkable resemblance to inquiries from the time of Elizabeth 
I.  
 
In 1987 the Comptroller and Auditor General prepared a report on the Charity Commissioner's 
monitoring and control of charities.77
                                                     
73  J. Wolfenden, op. cit., at p.1. 
 The findings of the report were to trigger a rapid 
succession of inquiries leading to substantial legislative and administrative changes to the 
environment of English charity regulation. It conducted an empirical study into the lodging and 
74  Ibid., at p.161. 
75  Great Britain, Law Reform Committee, The Powers and Duties of Trustees, 23rd Report, HMSO, London, 1982. 
76  Ibid., at pp.51-52. 
77  Great Britain, Monitoring and Control of Charities in England and Wales, National Audit Office, HMSO, 
London, 1987. 
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scrutiny of charity accounts by the Charity Commission. The survey of the Charity Commission 
register found that sixty-three per cent of registered charities had not submitted an account 
within the last five years. Letters to those charities on the register that had not lodged accounts 
revealed that forty-seven per cent of the defaulting charities were still operating and the 
remaining fifty-three per cent had ceased or could not be located.78 Only thirty-two per cent of 
these accounts had been audited and the Charity Commission annually examined only four per 
cent of the lodged accounts.79 Of the Commission's three hundred and thirty staff only eight 
were employed on the examination of accounts and the investigation of abuse, there was no 
qualified accountant.80 In 1991 the situation appeared to be improving slightly as it was expected 
that thirty-seven per cent of charities would lodge accounts as compared to eleven per cent in 
1989.81 These default rates may be compared with for contemporary profit company 
registrations with less than thirty per cent of companies failing to lodge returns.82
 
 
Thus a comparative analysis demonstrates that there was a gross regulatory failure of charity 
supervision. In 1988 the House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts examined that 
report and evidence of the Charity Commissioner.83 The Commission argued a lack of staff 
resources,84
 
 but the Committee noted, 
 But we cannot accept this as sufficient justification for its failure to take more active 
steps to monitor and investigate charities failing to submit accounts, for example by 
publishing lists of defaulters.85
 
  
This report was closely followed by the Woodfield Report on the supervision of charities.86
                                                     
78  Ibid., Appendix 1, at p.13. 
 It 
answered the frequent question of the smaller government tories about whether there was any 
need for the regulation of charities. It found that the Commission saved on legal costs and 
delays, aided the Inland Revenue in supervising charity exemptions, serviced the public's right to 
know about the existence of charities, their objects and beneficiaries, while being a source of 
79  Ibid., at p.7. 
80  Committee of Public Accounts, 7th Report, HMSO, London, 1991, at p.vii. 
81  op. cit., at p.viii. 
82  Great Britain, Board of Trade, The 1987-88 Report of the Board of Trade, HMSO, London, at p.47. 
83  Great Britain, Monoriting and Control of Charities in England and Wales, The House of Commons, Sixteenth 
Report from the Committee of Public Accounts, HMSO, London, 1988. 
84  Minutes of Evidence taken before the Committee of Public Accounts, 28 October, 1987, at p.1. 
85  Ibid., at p.viii. 
86  Great Britain, P. Woodfield, G. Binns, R. Hirst and D. Neal, Efficiency Scrutiny of the Supervision of Charities, 
Report to the Home Secretary and the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, HMSO, 1987, London. 
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guidance and advice on the definitions of charity to charities.87
 
 
The White Paper produced on charities as a result of the Woodfield Commission adopted most 
of the Woodfield recommendations.88 It dealt extensively with the doctrine of cy pres that was 
also the subject of comment by a Panel of British Parliamentarians formed to discuss the 
report.89 It considered further amendments to cy pres and the scheme making powers of the 
Charity Commission.90 The White Paper suggested that the Commission should appoint persons 
other than local authorities to conduct reviews of charities, small charitable trusts that have 
ceased to serve their objects could propose to alter their objects with the consent of the 
Commission and alter ineffectual administrative provisions of their trusts.91
  
 Again an inquiry 
further sought to find the appropriate body to reform charity. This authority has now in the 
history of these inquiries devolved from the courts to the Charity Commission, to local 
authorities and now to other local welfare agencies and the charities themselves.  
The recommendations of the Woodfield Committee concerning audited annual returns, a 
computerised register and sanctions for default in lodging were adopted.92 The powers of the 
Commission to deal with abuses were substantially upgraded with the Commission being able to 
take preventative measures such as suspending and replacing trustees, appointing receivers and 
restrictions on who could act as a trustee, as well as increased powers to search and acquire 
documents and exchange information with the taxation authorities.93
 
 
The White Paper also confirmed a number of administrative changes that followed the Thatcher 
theme of small government in that the transfer of charity land would no longer require the 
consent of the Charity Commission and the Office of the Official Custodian for Charities was to 
be abolished and the Commission was to recover costs by charging fees.94 This became law 
through a series of amendments to the Charities Act 1960 in 1992.95
 
  
The survey of English inquiries over four centuries reveals a number of themes which will be 
                                                     
87  Ibid., at p.10. 
88  Great Britain, Charities: A Framework for the Future, Cm 694, HMSO, London, 1989. 
89  Parliamentary Panel on Charity Law, Charity Supervision in the 1990's: A Response to the White Paper, HMSO, 
London, May 1990. 
90  Great Britain, Charities: A Framework for the Future, op. cit., at pp.33-37. 
91  Ibid., at p.35. 
92  Ibid., at p.24. 
93  Ibid., at pp.26-30. 
94  Ibid., at pp.42-49. 
95  The Charities Act Amendment Act (UK, 1992). 
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analysed in this work. First, the authors of most reports have had little empirical evidence to 
guide them in their deliberations and it has only been in the last two decades that the regulatory 
default of charities and state supervision is measured. Even so, there are fairly substantial 
indications that regulatory default has characterised the supervision of charities over the last four 
centuries. 
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Second, the judicial process of regulating charity has largely been abandoned to administrative 
arms of the state because of judicial expense, delays, legal technicalities and lack of interest by 
the Office of the Attorney General. The solution adopted was not to reform the judiciary or 
establish a new jurisprudence of charity law, but to interpose specialist administrative agencies 
to regulate charities that were theoretically supervised by the judiciary. The barriers to the 
judiciary acting as an effective regulator still exist, four centuries after they were first identified. 
There is a continual devolution in authority to increasingly localised agencies to participate in 
the reform process of moribund charities. 
 
This bypassing of the judiciary has implications for a legal system that operates on precedent and 
common law. If there is little use of the courts and therefore little opportunity for judges to 
advance the law in tune with societal expectations. This issue becomes even more apparent in 
the definition of charity that is dealt with later in this paper. 
 
INQUIRIES IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
 
The legal systems of the United States of America, New Zealand and Australia have adopted the 
jurisprudential concept of charity. Although these jurisdictions do not have the same rich or 
lengthy history of inquiries, it is appropriate to examine variations and similarities to the English 
inquiries.  
 
In comparison to the English inquiries, most of the Federal American reports have concerned the 
taxation exemption status of charities and their political lobbying activities, as opposed to 
redirecting the efforts of moribund charities. The first Federal proposal for regulating 
foundations came from the Commission on Industrial Relations in 1916 recommending a federal 
statute governing the chartering of all incorporated nonprofit organisations with funds in excess 
of one million dollars.96
 
 This was mainly aimed at the evil of accumulated funds in perpetuity, 
but the report did not result in legislation. 
The regulation of charities is a direct state responsibility and in accordance with the initial 
English tradition located in the Office of the Attorney General. In the 1940s two state 
investigations revealed, 
 
 ... the dormancy of many trusts, receipt of some trustees of excessive compensation, 
unwise investment of funds, and the danger of reversion of trust of property by 
virtue of non-compliance with the conditions of the grants97
                                                     
96  United States of America, Industrial Relations: Final Report and Testimony Submitted to Congress by the 
Commission on Industrial Relations, 64th Congress, 1st Session, Senate document 415, Government Printing Office, 
Washington, 1916. 
 
97  One report was conducted in Massachusetts in 1936 and the other in New Hampshire in 1943, refer Note, `State 
Supervision of the Administration of Charitable Trusts', Columbia Law Review, Vol.47, 1947, pp.659-664 at p.661 
and footnote 10. 
 P.O.N.C. Working Paper - QUT 
 
 18 
 
It was not until the 1950s that some states legislated for the supervision of charitable trusts, 
others still relying on common law.98 A study by Taylor of thirty-three states in the early fifties 
revealed that only one had a charitable register of any significance.99 Later in that decade, the 
number of state registers grew but compliance was limited, for example in California less than 
half the eligible trusts registered as required under the Act and a lone auditor was responsible for 
monitoring an estimated five billion in trust assets.100 The New Hampshire Attorney General 
reported that there was unsatisfactory administration of twenty-five per cent of charitable 
trusts.101
 
  
There appears to be little Federal interest in charity regulation until the Cox Committee of the 
House of Representatives102
 
 in the context of the McCarthy era sought to investigate the 
"unAamerican" activities of foundations, and returned a finding that, 
 So far as we can ascertain there is little basis for the belief expressed in some 
quarters that foundation funds are being diverted from their intended use.103
 
 
The report did recommend better public reporting of such organisations' accounts. The Reece 
Committee shortly afterwards re-examined the same issues and came to almost opposite 
conclusions finding that foundations were used as mechanisms for tax avoidance, dynastic 
control, political lobbying and extensive breaches of trust terms.104
 
  
The Patman Committee of 1961 departed from the location of these earlier federal committees 
by switching the investigations to the Small Business Congressional Committee and focusing on 
economic issues.105
                                                     
98  For example, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch.12, 8D (1958); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 109.32 (1953). These state acts 
replace rudimentary statutes such as the New York State, Tilden Act of 1893. 
 A series of reports presented to that committee pointed to the abuses of 
99  E.K. Taylor, Public Accountability of Foundations and Charitable Trusts, Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 
1953, at p.40 and Appendix A. 
100  K.L. Karst, `The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State Responsibility', Harvard Law 
Review, Vol.73, No.3, 1960, at pp.433-658 at p.456. 
101  G.G. Bogert, `Proposed Legislation Regarding State Supervision of Charities', Michigan Law Review, Vol.52, 
No.5, 1954, At pp.633-658 at p.643. 
102  United States of America, House of Representatives, Hearings before the Senate Select Committee to 
Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and United States of America Comparable Organisations, H. Rep. 561, 82nd 
Congress, 2nd Session. 
103  Ibid., at 259, quoted in P. Dobkin Hall, Inventing the Nonprofit Sector and Other Essays on Philanthropy, 
Voluntarism, and Nonprofit Organisations, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1992 at p.68. 
104  United States of America, House of Representatives, Special Committee to Investigate Foundations and 
Comparable Organisations, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, House Report No.2681. 
105  Patman's reports included Tax-Exempt Foundations and Charitable Trusts: Their Impact on Our Economy, 
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foundations through unfair competition with small business, wealth locked in the `dead hand', 
and taxation abuses. These reports led to the 1969 House Ways and Means Committee 
examination of the taxation environment of nonprofit organisations.106 The report recommended 
major changes to the regulation of taxation with restrictions on political lobbying, conflict of 
interest between donors, trustees and donees, deductibility of donor-controlled gifts and control 
of trustees by donors that were taken up in the Tax Reform Act of 1969.107
 
 
In 1973 a Commission was set up under the auspice of the US Treasury financed by Foundations 
with a joint membership of Congress, Treasury and the public, known as the Filer 
Commission.108 The Commission had  very wide terms of reference that went far beyond 
taxation issues to policy considerations of philanthropy, legal structure, regulation and economic 
issues. The Report was published in 1977, being six large volumes.109 One of its main 
recommendations was the establishment of a commission based on the English Charity 
Commission within the Treasury Department. This recommendation was not taken up by the 
incoming Carter administration.110
 
  
Of particular interest given the considerations of the present thesis is Volume Five of the 
Commission that concentrated on the regulation of philanthropy. This section included a review 
of both Federal and State regulation of fundraising, enforcement of trusts, self-regulation, 
financial reporting and lobbying. The Commission recognised the strong nexus between tax laws 
and the regulation of philanthropy. Because of the lack of co-ordination among the states on 
charitable regulation and the importance of the Federal taxation exemptions afforded charities, 
                                                                                                                                        
Chairman's Report to the Select Committee on Small Business, House of Representatives, 87th Congress, December 
31, 1962 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962); Tax-Exempt Foundations and Charitable Trusts: 
Their Impact on Our Economy, Second Instalment, Subcommittee Chairman's Report to Subcommittee No.1, Select 
Committee on Small Business, House of Representatives, 88th Congress, October 16, 1963 (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1963); Ibid., Third Instalment, March 20, 1964; Tax-Exempt Foundations: Their 
Impact on Small Business, Hearing Before Subcommittee No.1 on Foundations, Select Committee on Small 
Business, 88th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1964); Tax-Exempt 
Foundations and Charitable Trusts: Their Impact on Our Economy, Fourth Instalment, December 21, 1966; Tax-
Exempt Foundations and Charitable Trusts: Their Impact on Our Economy, Fifth Instalment, April 28, 1967; Tax-
Exempt Foundations: Their Impact on Small Business, Hearing Before Subcommittee No.1 of the Select Committee 
on Small Business, House of Representatives, 90th Congress, 1st Session (1967); Tax-Exempt Foundations and 
Charitable Trusts: Their Impact on Our Economy, Sixth Instalment, March 26, 1968. 
106  United States of America, House of Representative, Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, 
Government Printing Office, Washington, 1969. 
107  Pub. L. 91-172; 83 Stat. 487 (1969). 
108  United States of America, Report of the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, Giving in 
America: Toward a Stronger Voluntary Sector, Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, Washington, 
1975. 
109  United States of America, Research Papers Sponsored by the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public 
Needs, Department of Treasury, Washington, 1977, hereinafter referred to as "Filer". 
110  Dokin Hall, op. cit., at p.78. 
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the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was effectively regulating charitable activity in the United 
States, which is being used for regulatory rather than revenue collection objectives.111
 
 This 
regulatory role of the IRS is not unique to charities, being used to regulate many other sections 
of American life and commerce. The Commission while recommending that a separate 
regulatory body to supervise charities be formed, recommended that the IRS retain their tax 
supervisory role. 
The Commission also published a paper prepared by the Office of the Ohio Attorney General on 
the status of state regulation of charitable trusts, foundations and fundraising.112 It noted that 
state regulation of these matters was minimal in most states and non-existent in others. It 
recommended that Uniform Supervision of Trustees for Charitable Purposes and Model 
Solicitation Acts be prepared, state regulatory bodies be adequately staffed, adoption of uniform 
accounting standards and liberalised information exchange between states and the federal 
authorities.113
                                                     
111  Filer, op. cit., at p.2577. 
  
112  Ibid., at pp.2705-2776. 
113  Ibid., at p.2708-2709. 
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The National Association of Attorneys General updated the Ohio survey, in 1977.114 The report 
noted that Attorneys General have seldom used their powers to enforce or protect charitable 
trusts,115
 
 but this was not due to lack of opportunity. After reviewing the available data, the 
report remarked, 
 The above cases demonstrate the widely-acknowledged fact that abuses in charitable 
solicitions are common. Since approximately $26 billion in individual contributions 
is donated to charity each year, it is not unreasonable to assume that charity fraud is 
a multi-million dollar per year business.116
 
 
They gave as the reasons for the lack of attention, that charitable trusts were regarded as a 
relatively unimportant responsibility given the other more pressing duties of a state attorney 
general, little public pressure, lack of legal machinery and information about charities, together 
with a lack of statutory or common law clarification about the powers and responsibilities of the 
Attorney General in respect of charities.117 They also noted that enforcement by donors through 
visitation,118 beneficiaries or tax officials had not proved adequate either.119
 
 Those states such as 
Ohio, California and New York that had established charity units within Attorney General 
Departments still were not adequately supervising charities because they were understaffed and 
the report came to the conclusion that, 
 If these large offices are understaffed, the inescapable conclusion is that the proper 
supervision of charities is hampered in most states by a critical lack of supervisory 
personnel.120
 
 
In the American experience there is certainly evidence for regulatory failure by state regulators, 
with solutions of central registers that scrutinised financial reports with the need for appropriate 
resourcing. An important and in some respects unique inquiry was conducted in the United 
States by the Business Law Section of the American Bar Association. A subcommittee was 
                                                     
114  State Regulation of Charitable Trusts and Solicitations, The National Association of Attorneys General, 
Committee on the Office of Attorney General, Washington, 1977. 
115  Ibid., at p.6. 
116  The National Association of Attorneys General, State Regulation of Charitable Trusts and Solicitations, New 
Jersey, August, 1977, at p.42. 
117  Ibid., at p.6. 
118  Visitation refers the English tradition in mainly religious and educational institutions of appointing a "visitor" to 
inspect institutions and resolve internal disputes. The visitor was usually a bishop and the tradition still continues in 
Australia in some Universities. 
119  Ibid., at p.4. 
120  Ibid., at p.9. 
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formed of the Section to revise the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act.121  The Committee spent 
eight years drafting a model act to regulate nonprofit corporations. Such corporations were the 
legal vehicle for many charities and the committee settled on different categories of nonprofit 
entity depending on their purposes. The committee deliberations sparked the extensive academic 
debate led by Professor Henry Hansmann122
 
 and this is the first substantive interrogation of the 
structure of the law of charities and consideration of systemic problems. 
The committee rejected Hansmann's analysis, but its analysis was forced to address his 
arguments. It made a case for the stricter regulation of charities and the greater involvement of 
administrative oversight in comparison to other nonprofit purposes.123 This was based impliedly 
on Hansmann's underlying analysis and "the role they play in society and the representations they 
make to the public."124 However the product of this analysis was tempered by the decision to 
"track the Model Business Corporation Act in form and substance whenever appropriate,"125
 
 
which did not result in a radical departure from the traditional regulatory schema. The report is 
unique in that it is influenced by a reconception of the structures of law that could apply to the 
regulation of charities. 
In the last decade there have been intermittent inquiries through various Senate and 
Congressional committee that have been of minor importance dealing with fundraising abuse 
and tax avoidance.126 Reports of regulatory failure continue to persist with Oleck in 1988 citing 
estimates of United States charity fraud at being over eleven billion a year.127
 
 A recent United 
States study made the comment that, 
 When data on Nonprofits' reports range from 15 per cent to 62 per cent unreliable or 
incomplete, strong efforts to improve the situation are needed.128
 
 
                                                     
121  The Subcommittee on Model Nonprofit Corporation Law of the Business Law Section, American Bar 
Association, Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, 1987, Prentice Hall Law & Business, Clifton, New Jersey, 
1987. 
122  H.B. Hansmann, `The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise', Yale Law Journal, Vol.89, No.5, 1980, pp.835-898; H.B. 
Hansmann, `Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law', University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol.129, No.3, 1981, 
pp.497-623. 
123  Ibid., at p.xxvi. 
124  Ibid., at p.xxviii. 
125  Ibid., at p.xx. 
126  Most of these have been conducted through the House Ways and Means Committee and IRS hearings. 
127  H.L. Oleck, Nonprofit Corporations, Organizations, and Associations, 5th ed., Prentice Hall, Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey, 1988, at p.10, (citing Hancock and Chafetz's book, The Complete Swindler, at p.225). 
128  Nonprofit Quality Reporting Project, Enhancing The Quality of Public Reporting by Nonprofit Organisations, 
New York, 1991, at p.11. 
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They based their claim on reports that showed forty-eight per cent of Internal Revenue Service 
taxation returns by nonprofit organisations were lacking in financial information, Connecticut 
returns lodged with the Attorney-General had arithmetical errors in sixty-two per cent of 
accounts alone, with a fifty per cent error rate in Californian nonprofit financial returns.129
 
 
There has been a recent development initiated by a series of investigative reports by journalists 
in The Philadelphia Inquirer.130 The report chronicled taxation abuses, the lack of IRS 
supervision, fundraising frauds, excessive management salaries and administrative costs. Shortly 
after the appearance of the articles, the House Ways and Means Committee's subcommittee on 
oversight chaired by J.J. Pickle convened an inquiry into the charitable organisations exempt 
from income tax.131 The inquiry had an explosive start with allegations of abuse on a large scale, 
the IRS having a lower level of supervisory staff and funding to regulate charitable tax 
provisions than it had in 1980, despite an average of thirty thousand new charity registrations a 
year.132 The IRS spending on nonprofit audits between 1982 and 1992 declined by twenty-five 
per cent and a fifty per cent drop in the number of audits.133
 
 
The theme of regulatory default is evident in the American jurisdiction both with the supervision 
of charities and charities' compliance with regulations. The states' Office of the Attorney General 
has been reluctant to initiate judicial control of charities as in England, with supervision of 
charity falling to the Internal Revenue Service. What is a departure from the English inquiries is 
the development of model laws for the states that have promoted a debate on the role of law in 
the regulation of charity. 
 
In comparison New Zealand has had few inquiries into the regulation of charity, with only two 
inquiries of any note. In 1979 the New Zealand Property Law and Equity Reform Committee 
after an eleven year study released a report that concerned changes to the law to facilitate control 
and supervision of charitable trustees.134 It found that the only regulators of the charitable trust 
were the Attorney-General and processes of the common law, both of which were described as 
leading to the position, that charitable trusts were "uniquely free of supervision."135
                                                     
129  Ibid., at p.10. 
 It went on to 
suggest that there was no significant evidence of any maladministration, most donations were 
130  A series of Article published by G.M. Gaul & N.A. Borowski, Philadelphia Inquirer, 18-24 April 1993, special 
supplement. 
131  The Bond Buyer, Wednesday 16 June 1993 at p.1 and The Washington Post, 16 June 1993, at p.4. 
132  The Washington Post, ibid., at p.1. 
133  The Philadelphia Inquirer, 21 April 1993, at p.12. 
134  New Zealand, Property Law and Equity Reform Committee, Report on the Charitable Trusts Act, 1957, 
Department of Justice, Wellington, 1979. 
135  Ibid., at p.2. 
 P.O.N.C. Working Paper - QUT 
 
 24 
channelled through larger charities, which they assumed were most unlikely to maladminister 
the donations and most charities, even small ones were subject to an audit.136
 
 The audit of such 
charities was believed to be performed by honorary auditors who as a general principal of 
auditing, checked payments against the terms of the trust, although they offered no evidence that 
this was in fact the case. McKay commented in a telling remark that, 
 without the machinery that provides a guarantee of revealing what abuse there is, we 
can surely cannot use the present lack of evidence as an argument for not perfecting 
our supervisory methods.137
 
 
After reviewing the English Charity Commission model of regulation, it concluded that 
 
 it would be difficult to justify the setting up of a body of officials to supervise 
charitable trusts in New Zealand 
                                                     
136  Ibid., at p.5. 
137  L. McKay, Comment (on Proposals of the Property Law and Equity Reform Committee Working Paper on 
Control and Supervision of Charitable Trusts), New Zealand University Law Review, Vol.8, 1978, at pp.198-210 at 
p.206. 
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and that, 
 
 there is at present no justification for recommending any change to the law in this 
area.138
 
  
The report did, however, recommend that a register of charities should be kept and an annual 
audited financial statement lodged for the purpose of following up defaulters.139
 
 The intention 
was to rely on the control that auditors would perform over the charitable entity, with only 
serious abuses being handled by way application to the Attorney General. 
The report also echoed another theme of the English inquiries, the high cost of applications to 
the Supreme Court through the Attorney General for trusts that were subject to failure.140 It was 
suggested that property of small value could be dealt with by the Attorney General and with 
trustee initiated schemes, the problems identified in Re Goldwater deceased141 be addressed by 
advertising of the scheme and greater judicial power to entertain variations of the proposed 
scheme.142
 
 Here the Attorney General was to used as the administrative agency to cheaply speed 
the reform of failed trusts. 
It was not until 1989 that the New Zealand Government instigated another report on the 
regulation of charities, this time in the context of taxation reform. The New Zealand 
Government in an economic statement concerning extensive taxation reforms proposed to tax 
the trading profits of charitable and sporting organisations, remove the deduction that donors 
could make against their taxable income and support charitable groups through direct 
government grants.143
 
 As result of the public criticism the government decided to set up a 
working party to examine the matter, but its terms of reference also included drawing up,  
 The terms of reference, including the detailed functions, responsibilities and 
organisational structure of a Commission for Voluntary Welfare Agencies and 
Sporting Organisations.144
 
 
                                                     
138  Ibid., at p.7. 
139  Ibid., at p.28. 
140  Ibid., at p.13. 
141  Re Goldwater deceased [1967] NZLR 754. 
142  Ibid., at p.16. 
143  New Zealand, Economic Statement of New Zealand Government Printer, Wellington, 17 December 1978. 
144  New Zealand, Working Party on Charities and Sporting Bodies, Report to the Minister of Finance and The 
Minister of Social Welfare, 1989, Wellington, New Zealand Government Printer, at p.ix. 
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The Working Party noted that, 
 
 There is very real difficulty in ascertaining what abuse is occurring, in that the Inland 
Revenue Department does not pursue a policy of requiring returns from tax-exempt 
bodies as a matter of course145
 
 
and 
 
 the oversight of charities has been largely ineffective through the Charitable Trusts 
Act, and it does not apply to associations formed under the Incorporated Societies 
Act of 1908.146
 
  
The Working Party strongly recommended that a commission similar to the Charity Commission 
in England be established.147 It gave as its reasons the prevention of bogus charities, the 
improved accountability of charities to the public, the establishment of standards of 
administration and fundraising and approval of taxation status.148
 
 It was also proposed that such 
a commission would be largely self funding from services to charities and registration fees. 
These recommendations have yet to be implemented by the government. 
The New Zealand inquiries also indicate an unsupervised charity environment, with little 
empirical evidence about the extent of charity abuse or effectiveness of regulation. The Office of 
the Attorney General although charged with the responsibility of supervision rarely engages the 
judiciary to supervise charities. Registers of financial reports are again the suggested solution 
together with a proposed English style charity commission. There was no discernible debate on 
the appropriate legal environment or structure to regulate charities outside the English model. 
 
The inquiries held in Australia are only marginally more enlightening with most inquiries 
emanating from the State of Victoria. Victoria has the greatest concentration of charitable 
foundations and was the wealthiest State for much of Australia's recent history. Although in the 
decades before the turn of this century there were Royal Commissions in Victoria,149 New South 
Wales,150 Tasmania151 and Queensland152
                                                     
145  Ibid., at p.34. 
 they were not concerned about the regulation of 
146  Ibid., at p.57. 
147  Ibid., at p.62. 
148  Ibid., at pp.60-61. 
149  Victoria, Royal Commission on Charity, 1890, Final Report dated 22 December 1891, Parliamentary Papers, 
1891, Vol.6, 210. 
150  New South Wales, Select Committee into the Benevolent Asylum, New South Wales Legislative Assembly 
Votes and Proceedings, Vol.2, 1861-2; New South Wales, Royal Commission on Public Charities, Votes and 
Proceedings, Second Session, Vol.3, 1898. 
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charities by the State, but rather at their level of welfare provision.153 Kennedy concludes that 
colonial Victoria suffered from most of "the complaints endemic to competitive charity in 
England, apart perhaps from the tangled growth of endowed charities".154 The vast majority of 
funds for such charities were derived from the government, not public donors perhaps further 
explaining the lack of interest in private charity and therefore regulation.155
 
  
Even the contemporary federal governmental inquiries into welfare have made little if any 
reference to the regulation of charities and have been more interested in the accountability of 
government funding to voluntary organisations than structural reform of charities or their 
regulatory environment.156
 
 This may be a reflection of the constitutional division of powers and 
responsibilities between the Federal Government and the States. The States have responsibilities 
for the primary regulation of charities and the Federal Government has increasing control of 
funds provided for welfare services. It is perhaps not surprising that there has been no inquiry by 
the Federal Government into the regulation of charity, but more surprising that States have not 
reviewed charity regulation. Professor Colditz wrote at the end of an examination of Australian 
charity taxation laws in 1977 that, 
 It is worthy of mention that there appears to be a remarkable lack of control, or even 
of public access to information concerning charitable and religious institutions. 
Although the author has made few direct enquiries his investigations lead him to the 
view that many exempt-income institutions and funds do not lodge information 
returns with the taxation authorities, nor of course in the absence of covering 
legislation would information in respect of such bodies be made available to the 
public if information returns were lodged.157
                                                                                                                                        
151  Tasmania, Royal Commission on Charitable Institutions, Tasmanian Legislative Council Parliamentary Paper, 
No.47 of 1871. 
 
152  Queensland, Select Committee on Hospitals in the Colony, Legislative Assembly Votes and Proceedings, Vol.1, 
1866; Queensland, Select Committee on the Management of the Dunwich Benevolent Asylum, Legislative Assembly 
Votes and Proceedings, Vol.1, Part 2, 1884. 
153  The commissioners concerned themselves with such detail as introducing female nursing staff and sanitary 
conditions at hospitals and their location, rather than tracking down dormant funds or redirecting charitable trusts. 
154  R. Kennedy, Charity and Ideology in Colonial Victoria, in Australian Welfare History: Critical Essays, ed. R. 
Kennedy, MacMillan, Melbourne, 1982, at p.70. 
155  Kennedy, op. cit., at p.68. 
156  For example commissions such as Commonwealth of Australia, Commission of Inquiry into Poverty, Australian 
Government Printing Service, Canberra, 1976; Commonwealth of Australia, Royal Commission on Australian 
Government Administration, Welfare-Health Task Group Report, Australian Government Printing Service, 
Canberra, 1976; Commonwealth of Australia, Through a Glass Darkly: Evaluation in Australian Health and Welfare 
Services, Vol.1, Senate Standing Committee on Social Welfare, Australian Government Printing Service, Canberra, 
1979. 
157  B.T. Colditz, Income Tax Aspects of the Income of Charities and of Gifts to Charities, The Taxation Institute of 
Australia Research and Education Trust, Sydney, 1977, at p.35. 
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 Sufficient has been said to indicate that for a broad range of charities the Income 
Tax Assessment Act and regulations provide little control over the activities of 
organisations, institutions or funds the income of which is exempt or donations to 
which are allowable deductions. It is understood that in many cases the information 
returns are not required by the revenue authorities.158
 
 
The Victorian Chief Justice's Law Reform Committee examined charitable trusts in 1965.159 
The review was prompted by the Nathan Report and the adoption of the Charities Act (UK, 
1960).160
 
 In Victorian it was the Attorney General that was responsible for the supervision of 
charitable trusts. The Committee candidly stated that, 
 The Attorney-General has many other duties and cannot with the staff at his 
command undertake the general supervision of charitable trusts. In practice he has 
made inquiries only in cases where some matter requiring his intervention is brought 
to his notice. There is therefore in practice no general supervision over the 
administration of such trusts.  ... the Attorney-General under the present state of 
affairs simply cannot possibly undertake an investigation of them.161
 
 
To address such a state of affairs the Committee recommended that there be compulsory 
registration of charitable trusts.162 This registry was seen as a more modest English Charity 
Commission that would act to inform the public as to the activities of charitable trusts, provide 
administrative scrutiny and advice to the Attorney General.163 The Victorian Chief Justice's 
Committee also noted the now familiar problems of failed charities and legislation was enacted 
which closely followed that of the English Nathan Committee.164 Similar provisions were 
adopted in Queensland and South Australia.165
 
 
The Victorian State Government in 1980 established an interdepartmental working party to 
                                                     
158  Ibid., at p.38. 
159  Victoria, Chief Justice's Law Reform Committee, Report on Charitable Trusts, Melbourne, 1965. 
160  Ibid., at p.1, "and in our report we have to consider whether we should adopt the provision of that Act [English 
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161  Ibid., at p.15. 
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163  Ibid., at p.8. 
164  Ibid., at p.22 and Section 2 of The Charities Act, (Vict., 1978). 
165  Charities Act (Victoria, 1978), section 2; Trusts Act (Queensland, 1973) Section 105(2); Trustee Act (South 
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report on the administration of charities.166 The Hospitals and Charity Act had provided a 
scheme of regulation and scrutiny of welfare service providing charities in Victoria.167 The Act 
required every institution and benevolent society to be registered and no institution or 
benevolent society could be established without the consent of the Health Commission that 
administered the Act. An academic study inspired by the inquiry found for the year 1978 that 
less than twenty-three per cent of unsubsidised charities had lodged annual reports and returns, 
with thirty-six per cent of subsidised charities having lodged such returns. A further survey of 
the same registry was attempted some five years later.168 It found that less than forty-four per 
cent of the charities had lodged annual returns and reports for the year 1983.169
 
 
The Working Party assiduously avoided mentioning the study and considered that the then 
proposed incorporated associations legislation would better provide supervision of such 
charities.170 The Health Department responsibility had grown out of its historical supervision of 
ancillary welfare services and the distribution of state run lottery proceeds to fund these services 
and was eager to shed responsibility for the charity register. A second report by the working 
party was prepared after the introduction of the Victorian Associations Incorporation Act171 and 
recommended that charity supervision could be adequate maintained under that act and by the 
traditional supervisory role of the Attorney General.172
 
  
Finally in 1985 the Victorian Health Department in another review of the Hospitals and 
Charities Act, 1958 convinced the government to excise regulation of charities from their 
responsibilities.173
 
 The unit's recommendations resulted in a new act, the Health Services Act 
1985, which did not carry on the regulation of community organisations. They reported that, 
 The Review Unit believes that current law in this regard is excessively regulatory 
and largely unnecessary in the light of recent developments in the law.174
                                                     
166  Victoria, State Government Interdepartmental Working Party, Administration of Charities (First Report), 
Melbourne, 1980, fourth term of reference, at p.17. 
 
167  (Vict., 1958) based on the Hospitals and Charitable Institutions Act of 1864 (Vict.) and the Hospitals and 
Charity Act 1922 (Vict.). 
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It was reasoned that the provisions of the Act were not enforced or complied with since its 
enactment as government had funded most of the social welfare delivery and had its own 
accountability mechanisms.  Further members of the public ought to be able to make up their 
own minds about "what they do with their money."175
 
 The Review Unit concluded that other 
legislation provided an adequate framework for the accountability of charities and meet the 
needs to safeguard the public interest. 
This reliance on other than a central charity statute to regulate charities has been also the stated 
position of other state inquiries as well, for example the New South Wales Review of the 
Charitable Collections Act 1943 noted,  
 
 Such a system would ensure that the overall activities, structure and administration 
of organisations carrying out fundraising appeals are monitored by the authority 
administering the incorporation statute..."176
 
 
An examination of the inquiry reports of incorporation laws shows no attention to the issues of 
regulating charities. The Victorian Chief Justice's Law Reform Committee on Unincorporated 
Associations177 sought to draft an act that would mitigate the four issues that had been raised by 
Professor Bob Baxt in his article entitled The Dilemma of the Unincorporated Association.178 
The Committee's report did not address the issue of charity except for the issue of the 
distribution of assets on the winding up of an association.179  It was simply concerned with 
devising a functional legal form in the image of a company to overcome problems associated 
with the unincorporated association's lack of a legal persona. This approach was common to all 
the Law Reform Commission reports of the era that either proposed an incorporated associations 
act or such an act's reform in most states and territories of Australia.180
                                                     
175  Ibid., at p.7. 
 The New South Wales 
Law Reform Commission in its report on incorporated associations characterised the law of 
charitable trusts as an alternative legal form for associations, but decided that charitable trust law 
had a narrow scope of purposes that would preclude many associations from taking advantage of 
176  New South Wales, Chief Secretary's Department, A Review of the Charitable Collections Act, 1934, Sydney, 
1989, at p.16. 
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pp.305-316. 
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the benefits of charitable trust law.181
 
 They did not address the issue of associations formed for 
charitable purposes and any special regulatory needs that might be required. It was assumed that 
either they would not choose the legal form of an incorporated association or if they did, they 
required no special regulatory provisions from other types of association. 
The most comprehensive review of charity regulation in Australia was conducted by the Legal 
and Constitutional Committee of the Victorian Parliament. In 1988 it was given terms of 
reference to inquire into the law relating to charitable trusts.182 The terms of reference of the 
Parliamentary committee was to advise on the "desirability of revising and simplifying the law 
relating to charitable trusts"; simplification of "the role performed by the Supreme Court and the 
Attorney General"; the possibility of the restatement "of the law in a single statute".183 As 
Victoria then had eighty percent of the charitable trusts in Australia this is an important 
report.184
 
 
The Committee found that there were practical problems with the Victorian Attorney General 
acting as protector of charities due to a lack of resources and an identifiable officer or point of 
contact.185 Investigation procedures had been used twice or three times from 1981-1989,186 and 
only fifty matters of cy pres between 1982-1989.187 It found that there were delays of up to two 
to three years for cy pres matters to be processed.188 It recommended that the jurisdictional 
ceiling for small estate schemes administered by Attorney General be lifted in value. It endorsed 
the revision of the law after the Victorian Chief Justice's Committee concerning cy pres with 
only minor suggestions for improvement.189
 
 Again the issue of failing charities was dealt with 
by supplanting the judiciary with an administrative agency and when the agency did not perform, 
its administrative procedures were subjected to reform. 
The Committee heard that the current level of regulation was sufficient in the opinion of the 
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"many groups and individuals",190 pointing to the remedies available upon a breach of trust, 
registration through the Australian Taxation Office, and the investigatory powers of the Attorney 
General. It concluded that additional compulsory registration would serve little purpose. In 
particular, the cost involved in establishing such a registry was perceived to outweigh any 
potential benefits acknowledged in terms of increased accessibility to information.191
 
 However, 
they concluded, 
 While the Committee in fact received no evidence to suggest that there was abuse of 
the charitable trust mechanism or maladministration by trustees, it is conscious that 
this does not of itself confirm conclusively that such abuse does not exist.192
 
  
It took note of the potential for abuses and the work of academics on the Victorian Charities 
register that pointed to a large regulatory failure.193 The committee recommended that a statutory 
officer in the Office of the Attorney General be created to take over the role of the supervision of 
charities which not only regulated charities but also dispensed advice and training. This had been 
recommended in the Victorian Chief Justice's Committee's recommendation in 1965, but it was 
not taken up because it meant extra costs involved the creation of a new bureaucracy.194
 
 The 
report has not been implemented. 
The same Victorian Parliamentary Committee in 1989 inquired into the public liability of 
voluntary organisations.195
 
 The committee focussed on issues concerning the personal liability 
of members and management of nonprofit organisations. They suggested insurance schemes to 
protect the public and members of organisations rather than statutorily limit the liability. 
The Victorian inquiries have received evidence that the register of charities and the supervision 
by the Attorney General has been deficient. The inquiries sought to ensure charities were 
accountable by increasing the responsiveness of the Attorney General by dedicated charity 
supervision resources and reliance on the provisions general nonprofit incorporation statutes. 
There was no analysis of the other legal structures that could be used to improve the 
accountability of charities outside the traditional charity law paradigm.  
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The lack of compliance by charities with submission of annual financial returns in Victoria is 
mirrored in at least one other State of Australia. A survey of Queensland Companies limited by 
guarantee and incorporated associations in 1988 also showed substantial default rates for the 
lodging of annual returns.196 Although these organisations are overwhelmingly nonprofit 
entities, many are charitable in nature. Companies limited by guarantee had a default rate of 
some fifty-two per cent with thirty-one per cent being more than one year in arrears, and four per 
cent being more than ten years in arrears.197 In comparison for the same period, Queensland 
incorporated associations had a less than twenty percent default rate, but the Act had only been 
passed five years earlier and more than half the associations had not been registered for more 
than two years.198
 
  
In 1989 a nonprofit company limited by guarantee in Victoria collapsed owing creditors over 
three hundred and twenty million dollars.199 The Victorian Commissioner for Corporate Affairs 
instigated a study of all companies limited by guarantee of a similar nature to the collapsed 
company.200 The study could contact only sixty-two per cent of the companies on the register.201 
Of those companies that replied twenty per cent did not have an audited financial statement as 
required by the Act and fifty-six per cent failed to comply with the accounting standards.202 A 
similar survey of Queensland companies limited by guarantee revealed strikingly similar 
results.203
 
 
It might be the case that such default is standard for any registry, but the available data on 
commercial corporate registers is significantly lower. Yum in 1979 found that Victorian 
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proprietary limited companies had an annual default rate of twenty-five per cent.204 In 1988 the 
National Companies and Securities Commission issued eighteen per cent of commercial 
companies with late penalty notices for lodgement of annual returns.205
 
 
In Queensland, charities that seek donations from the public with the exception of religious 
organisations are required to  registered under The Collections Act (Qld, 1966). It was found that 
for the year 1989 there was a default rate in lodgement of thirty-eight per cent and in 1992 a 
thirty-one per cent default in lodgements.206 Only fifty-three per cent of organisations had lodged 
returns in both periods.207 The New South Wales review of the Charitable Collections Act 1943 
also reported that there was substantial non-compliance with lodgement of returns, but did not 
quantify the default.208
 
 
Financial case studies of a representative sample of Queensland charities under the Collections 
Act also indicated that such organisations' audited reports were poorly presented in general and 
did not provide a basis for scrutiny or examination of the activities of the charity.209
 
 The auditor 
plays a significant role in the regulation of charity accounts, as the administrators use it as an 
early warning indicator that a breach may have occurred in the charity if a qualified reported is 
presented or the audit seeks a release from the audit engagement. 
Radich in the study of the auditors of the same Queensland organisations compared a sample of 
auditors' nonprofit audit procedures to for-profit audits with the same turnover.210 Serious doubt 
was thrown on the reliability of such audits given that such audits tended to be conducted by 
junior staff in less time than comparable for-profit audits, with fewer engagement letters, 
inappropriate estimations of control risks and less time spent on compliance testing.211
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audits.212
 
 This indicates that many auditors who had retired or had a qualification but could not 
practise as for profit auditors were performing audits for nonprofit organisations.  
The recent Australian, United States and New Zealand inquiries all have compliance statistics 
similar to those in England. There is evidence to indicate that the compliance of charities with 
lodging annual returns is low, supervision of the Attorney General is often non-existent and 
although often recommended there are no administrative agencies whose prime task is to 
regulate charities. In England the proposed solution has been a central and integrated statutory 
instrument to regulate charities. In other jurisdictions the task falls to administrators to whom 
charities are a subsidiary consideration, and often charity regulation is spread among a 
multiplicity of agencies. 
 
In comparison, the English schema of a Charity Commission has resulted in a pivotal charity 
statute. The Charities Act includes fundraising regulation, real property laws and court 
procedures with other acts and regulators revolving around the Act. For example a company 
limited by guarantee that wishes to seek a licence to dispense with the tag "limited" after its 
name deals with the corporate regulators, but the corporate regulators rely on a decision of the 
Commission as to whether the company is charitable or not, the same applies to the definition of 
charitable for income tax purposes.  
 
In the other jurisdictions there is not a central legislative provision that is dedicated to the 
regulation of charities. In the United States of America, the Internal Revenue Service is seen as 
the major national regulator of charities, which has many other functions other than the 
supervision of charities. In the American States, it is the Office of Attorney General that 
regulates charities along with many other responsibilities. Even though some States have 
specific legislation to regulate charities, it is often a different statute that regulates fundraising by 
charities. For example, the statutes that permit a charity to obtain a corporate persona are also 
part of general corporation statutes or as in the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act 
included with other forms of nonprofit enterprise such as religious and mutual benefit 
corporations.213
 
 The regulation of charities is scattered through a number of statutory provisions 
and a number of administrative bodies. Inquiries on the regulation of charitable enterprise place 
reliance on statutes and administrations that have charities regulation as a subsidiary function to 
their core purpose. There is also substantial reliance on a perhaps improbable interlocking 
network of these statutes and administrators to efficiently and appropriately regulate charities. 
Judicial supervision is not relied on to regulate charities as it is expensive, lengthy and technical. 
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Apart from one inquiry in the United States, no inquiry has considered a paradigm shift of the 
legal basis for the regulation of charity. These themes were also evident in the survey of English 
inquiries and the next section of this work identifies another theme that runs strongly throughout 
each of the jurisdiction's inquiries. It is the definition of charity. 
 
THE DEFINITION OF CHARITY 
 
The boundaries set for the legal definition of charity are an issue addressed by inquiries even 
when specifically excluded from the inquiry's terms of reference.214 Comments that the 
definition is obscure, anomalous, out of touch with community expectations and capable of 
comprehension to only specialist charity lawyers is made in many of the inquiry reports. Even 
judges have admitted difficulty in coming to grips with the rationale of the definition.215
 
 Despite 
the consistency of such comments there have been few recommendations that the definition be 
altered even at the margins, and when made these recommendations have largely been ignored 
by governments. The boundaries of charity are perceived as a central issue in this work and a 
review of attitudes found in inquiries to the definition establishes an important basis for further 
theoretical analysis. 
The Nathan Committee examined the case for and against a new statutory definition of 
charity.216 The Committee noted that those who were not lawyers argued that the definition 
arising from common law and the Statute of Elizabeth was archaic and unsuited for modern 
conditions and that judicial interpretation led to borderline cases that could only be resolved by 
reference to expensive litigation.217
 
 Those who were lawyers favoured the retention of the 
present common law definition of charity, the committee noting, 
 All legal witnesses warned us of the danger that a statutory definition, whether or 
not in Lord MacNaughten's language, might have the effect of throwing into the 
melting pot all the existing case law on the subject.218
 
 
and, 
 
 ... the law must continue to be judge-made and that it is a complete delusion to 
suppose that to start with a clean slate would reduce the number of difficult cases or 
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the volume of litigation. On the contrary, the elaborate and expensive process of 
building up case law would, as it seems to us, start all over again.219
 
 
The Committee was persuaded that a new statutory definition of the decided case law would 
permit the judiciary more flexibility "in applying the well-established principles of the existing 
law to the problems of an age of rapid and continuous change."220
 
 It discounted lawyers' claims 
remarking that, 
 the draftsman's task of modernising the language without affecting the general 
content of charity or rendering the case law obsolete is not an impossible one.221
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However the government's response in the following White Paper did not propose a new 
statutory definition of charity.222
 
 
The Tenth Report of the Expenditure Committee, 1974-75 examined not only the Charity 
Commissioners and their accountability, but also the definition of charity.223
 
 They noted that, 
 virtually all our witnesses, although concerned about the ambiguity of the definition 
of charity, were not only unable to put forward a satisfactory solution but also 
reluctant to recommend that there should be a new statutory definition of charity.224
 
  
There was a proposal to alter the definition of charity to that of a "non-profit distributing 
organisation".225 All organisations would benefit from charity status so long as the organisation 
adhered to what Hansmann was to call the nondistribution constraint. This was seen by the 
proposers as a shift from that "there should be public benefit from the activities of a non-profit 
distributing organisation" to that "there should not be private benefit."226 This was regarded as a 
radical definition with Inland Revenue regarding it as open to abuse with substantial financial 
implications.227 The Committee did acknowledge that the common law was loosing its 
flexibility because of a lack of appeals to the High Court on account of costs.228
 
 Professor 
Sheridan endorsed the findings commenting that, 
 The courts can be stultified if they do not experience a cross-section of social problems; 
the law itself can if stultified if, through lack of litigation, its concepts are not broadened 
(and refined) slowly down from precedent to precedent; and the judicial definition of 
charity cannot be criticised for failing to keep up with the times if the judiciary are denied 
the opportunity to pronounce.229
 
 
Particular concern was noted of legally defined charities that were religious cults or took overt 
political stances that the committee believe ought not to be given the privileged status of 
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charitable.230 The choice of the resolution to this problem is telling, it was not to amend the 
ambiguous definition of charity that allowed such a situation, but for the Charity Commissioner 
to indirectly control such behaviour by administrative means.231
 
 
The Goodman Committee was convened by the National Council of Social Service as an inquiry 
into the effect of charity law and practice on voluntary organisations. As previously mentioned 
the bulk of the report concerned the definition of charity and the very real problems in its 
interpretation.232 It received a substantial submission to the effect that the concept of charity 
ought to be replaced by the concept of "non-profit distributing organisations".233 With this 
definition the object and the activities of the organisation are irrelevant sweeping aside the 
problems of definition of charity. The Committee however rejected the notion as it would 
unacceptably have included political parties and because an Inland Revenue submission claimed 
that it would create opportunities for abuse.234 They agreed with the Nathan Committee that a 
statutory definition should be produced to clarify the meaning of charity and actually produced a 
list of activities.235
 
 
The Woodfield report specifically had the definition of charity excluded from its terms of 
reference, but it still commented that,  
 
 The law relating to the definition of charitable status is complicated and even highly 
experienced solicitors in this field have told us that the Charity Commission's advice 
and authority are most helpful.236
 
  
The White Paper following the Woodfield Report did however tackle the issue of definition of 
charity.237 It took the view that the definition of charity ought not to be subject to "any 
substantive change".238
                                                     
230  Ibid., at p.xiv. 
 Again the conclusion was that any tinkering with the definition would 
231  Ibid., at p.xviii. 
232  NCSS Committee of Inquiry into the Effect of Charity Law and Practice on Voluntary Organisations, National 
Council of Social Service, London, 1976. 
233  Ibid., at p.10. 
234  Ibid., at p.11. 
235  Ibid., at p.16 and the list of charitable purposes at Appendix 1, at pp.123-125. 
236  Woodfield, op. cit., at p.10. 
237  Great Britain, Secretary of State for the Home Department, Charities a Framework for the Future, HMSO, 
Cm.694, May 1989, London. 
238  Ibid., at p.5. 
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result in chaos predicting that, "Instead of being simplified the law would be ossified."239 This is 
at odds with other comments that the lack of appeals to the High Court on the definition of 
charity because of legal expense meant that the common law was becoming ossified.240
 
 The 
Parliamentary Panel following Woodfield took the same line, 
 Moreover, the Panel takes the view that introducing a statutory definition, apart from 
its inevitable exclusion of much worthy activity, and consequent new anomalies, 
would, disastrously, render the definition politically contentious. This would almost 
certainly result in reduced public commitment to charities and their work. The Panel 
therefore hopes that the Government will remain steadfast in this view."241
 
 
It was mooted in the paper, but not recommended, that the definition be altered to "purposes 
beneficial to the community", but as this would widen the definition, it was thought that, "It 
would be notably subjective and would be likely to give rise to a great deal of litigation."242 The 
issue of religious cults and political activities again arose and it was decided that this could be 
adequately dealt with through supervisory powers of the Charity Commission.243
 
  
The English inquiries establish that the definition of charity is complex, but this in itself is not 
unusual for legal definitions. What makes the definition of charity an important issue for 
discussion both for inquiries and the Industry Commission, is the lack of affinity with 
community expectations, lack of comprehension by all except specialist lawyers, ossification of 
judicial interpretation by lack of judicial review caused by expensive and lengthy legal 
proceedings and the complete inability to remedy these problems, other than by marginal 
administrative procedures.  
 
Definitional issues in the other jurisdictions have been remarkably similar. The New Zealand 
Property Law and Equity Reform Committee's report of The Charitable Trusts Act 1957 
examined the inclusion of minor amendments to the definition. These were the inclusion of 
recreational facilities244 and the relief of victims and their dependants of a disaster in the 
definition of charity.245
                                                     
239  Ibid., at p.7. 
 The New Zealand Working Party on Charities and Sporting Bodies in 
240  Great Britain, The Tenth Report from the Expenditure Committee, 1974-75, Charity Commissioners and their 
Accountability, HMSO, London, 1975 at p.xxxi. 
241  Great Britain, Parliamentary Panel on Charity Law, Charity Supervision in the 1990's: A Response to the White 
Paper, May 1990, HMSO, London, at p.6. 
242  Ibid., at p.7. 
243  Ibid., at p.10. 
244  Ibid., at pp.18-20. 
245  Ibid., at p.17. 
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1989 commented, 
 
 It is easy to ask the question "what is charity?", it was much more difficult to 
answer. The legal definition is elusive.246
 
 
and 
 
 The Working Party has concluded that changing the definition of what is a charity 
was not the way to determine eligibility for preferential taxation treatment, and that 
the current definitions of charity or charitable purposes which have evolved over the 
years should apply in the meantime.247
 
 
It has been a similar theme in Australia, the Victorian Chief Justice's Law Reform Committee 
concluded in 1965 that drafting a satisfactory definition of charity was "beyond human 
ingenuity".248 The New South Wales Review of the Charitable Collections Act 1943 endorsed 
the Victorian Chief Justice's view recommended that no new statutory definition of charity be 
included.249 The Victorian State Government Interdepartmental Working Party of 1980 despite 
being given in its terms of reference, "to determine what constitutes a charitable organisation"250
 
 
wrote that, 
 Members of the working party do not wish and do not consider themselves qualified 
to attempt that task251
 
 
and referred to the Victorian Chief Justice's conclusions noted previously.252
 
 The second report 
of the same interdepartmental committee that contained representatives of the Attorney-
General's Office plainly stated again, 
 Members of the working party do not wish and do not consider themselves qualified 
to attempt that task [the definition of charity]253
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Minister of Social Welfare, 1989, New Zealand Government Printer, Wellington, at p.77. 
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The Victorian Parliamentary Committee considered many submissions that argued that, 
 
 the guidelines for determining charitable status are out of touch with contemporary 
ideas of benefit and welfare and that an expansive statutory definition would be 
more useful.254
 
 
Further they pointed out that the common law can only respond reactively, once the issue has 
been litigated, and there are few solicitors who would take the chance when drafting a charitable 
instrument to nominate a doubtful purpose. The Commission noted that, 
 
 This may result in a vicious cycle in which the issue of the validity of a purpose that 
the courts could clarify would never reach them.255
 
 
However, the Committee refused to recommend an alteration to the definition of charity because 
of the difficulty of a statutory definition. It pointed out firstly that no other jurisdiction had 
implemented a substantial change, and secondly, problems of a changed definition for other 
legislation that also used the term and thirdly, possible issues of nonalignment with the 
Commonwealth taxation statutes that exempted certain charities.256 Other Australian inquiries 
touching on the definition have been those conducted by State Law Reform Commissions 
focussing on very specific marginal issues concerning the definition of charity, such as 
recreation facilities, sports and mixed purposes.257
 
  
The American inquiries do not fit the pattern of English, New Zealand or Australian inquiries in 
respect of the definition of charity. Several aspects of the American system of charity regulation 
have contributed to the lack of debate around the definition of charity. The first aspect is that 
pure charitable trusts form a very small minority of the legal vehicles used to facilitate charitable 
purposes and so the definition does not assume the importance that it does in other 
jurisdictions.258
                                                                                                                                        
Victorian Government Printer, Melbourne, 31 March 1982, at p.28. 
 The nonprofit corporation is the major vehicle for such activity. Second, the 
Internal Revenue Service does not rely on the definition of charity to regulate taxation 
254  Ibid., at p.15. 
255  Ibid., at pp.32-33. 
256  Ibid., at pp.34-35. 
257  Tasmania, Report on the Variations of Charitable Trusts, No.38, Law Reform Commission of Tasmania, 
Government Printer, Tasmania, 1984; Queensland Report on the Law Relating to Trusts, Trustees, Settled Land and 
Charities, QLRC 8, Queensland Law Reform Commission, 1971. 
258  J.J. Fishman, `The Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law and an Agenda for Reform', Emory Law 
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exemption, but includes a broad definition that includes many other purposes outside the 
technical legal definition of charity. There is still concern with the wider definition of tax exempt 
organisations in America as the recent Philadelphia Inquirer newspaper reports indicate.259
 
 
The American debate has made a jurisprudential paradigm shift from the trust and charity to the 
concept of nonprofit organisations. This has raised more appropriate questions for the 
definitional boundaries based on what is the nature of such organisations, what is their function 
and what is an appropriate regulatory framework. These issues were introduced in the last 
chapter through an analysis of Professor Henry Hansmann's work. 
 
The inquiries have found that the definition of charity is understood only by lawyers, and then a 
select few who have difficulty is explaining or rationalising the definition. The definition is 
found to produce inappropriate results that are largely contrary to public expectations and has 
failed to keep pace with community attitudes. The few suggested alterative statutory definitions 
of charity have not recommended themselves to inquiries especially in the face of claims by 
lawyers that such definitions will result in legal uncertainty and increased litigation costs. This 
seems to be at odds with the claim that the common law definition permits the courts flexibility 
to alter the definition to account for current attitudes. The very expense of such court 
proceedings has led to several inquiries to report an ossification of the definition, due to a lack of 
court actions and prudence of charity instrument drafters to avoid possible contentious areas of 
the law. The law and policy of charity definition in England, New Zealand and Australia have 
reached a point of stagnation. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This survey of the major commissions, inquiries and empirical compliance measurement of 
charity accountability and regulation has revealed a number of themes. First, the authors of some 
reports have had little empirical evidence to guide them in their deliberations. There is a 
substantial body of anecdotal evidence that charity registers are characterised by regulatory 
default. There is no authoritative data on the size of frauds. In one respect this is not surprising 
given the lack of supervision exercised by regulators outlined in many of the reports considered 
in the earlier part of this paper and generally a lack of statistics of the nonprofit sector generally. 
There appears to be more evidence to support a claim of a degree of fraud than that which 
indicates that any fraud is of aberrant significance. 
 
The empirical data in the regulatory compliance patterns of charities or nonprofit organisations 
in general, does not encourage confidence. This trend has been present across centuries in the 
English experience and found in contemporary English, American and Australian jurisdictions. 
The small amount of empirical data indicates that compliance with regulation placed on 
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nonprofit entities and in particular charitable entities is not high and below that of comparable 
for profit regulation.  
 
Second, the overwhelming majority of inquiries have found that the traditional means of 
supervising charities, being through the common law courts or the office of the Attorney 
General, have not performed their regulatory function. The common law courts will only operate 
to regulate charities if persons are willing to bring matters before the courts, or even more 
pointedly if there are persons who can bring the matter before the courts. The nature of charities 
without specific beneficiaries who might litigate and the cost and delays of the judicial system, 
particularly the equity courts, has resulted in the courts performing a very minor role in the 
regulation of charity in all jurisdictions. This appears to be so in the case of a direct intervention 
in charity abuse or as a deterrent for those contemplating regulatory breach. 
 
The Attorney General has traditionally been identified with the role as the protector of charities, 
parens patraie, but through centuries and across national boundaries this role has been 
completely neglected. Only in a few American states has it ever been a serious function of the 
Attorney General's Office, and even here it has been found to be less than satisfactory.  
 
Third, the English solution to the default of both the courts and the Attorney General has been to 
create an administrative arm of government to be a dedicated regulator of charities in the form of 
the Charity Commission. However, even the Commission has had difficulty in regulating 
charities, claiming lack of resources and staff to monitor them. The English inquiries have not 
entirely agreed that the problem is only lack of staff and resources, hinting at both improved 
management practices, a change in philosophy of the regulators and style of the regulatory 
implements used. 
 
With the issue of reforming moribund charities using the cy pres doctrine, the English inquiries 
followed closely by Australia and New Zealand have again largely replaced the judiciary with 
administrative agencies. The English moving even further towards more local agencies to detect 
and reform such charities.  
 
Fourth, despite American, New Zealand and Australian inquiries' recommendations for the 
establishment of a central administrative authority similar to the Charities Commission to 
regulate charities, it has not been adopted in these jurisdictions. England has a central and 
integrated statutory instrument to regulate charities, whereas in other jurisdictions the task falls 
to administrators to whom charities are a subsidiary consideration, and charity regulation is 
spread among a multiplicity of agencies. These jurisdictions rely on an interlocking of different 
laws, often from state and federal jurisdictions, to regulate charities. 
 
Fifth, there is little theoretical framework in the inquiries that binds together the analysis of what 
is the role of law in charity or the role of administrators.  The inquiries have adopted the 
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traditional cultural assumptions and perceptions of charity and voluntary action, often waxing 
eloquent in their introductions about the sacredness of the institutions they are about to examine. 
The lawyers, with the exception of the recent American inquiries, have expressed no coherent 
jurisprudence of charity law and its role in society. In marked contrast they warm to the 
traditional analytical legal tasks such as reconciliation of conflicting precedents and the judicial 
decisions provide fertile ground for such endeavours. 
 
Sixth, in comparison the lay Commission's recommendations to alter the legal definition of 
charity have been ignored and legal argument for the status quo has prevailed. There is a 
widening gap between the societal expectations about the definition of charity and the 
ossification of the definition of charity that has been left in the hands of the judiciary. The 
paralysis of both the precedent development and the will of legislators to reformulate the bounds 
of charity is a problem that remains to be addressed. 
 
The inquiries have provided a rich primary source to establish the perceived problems of charity 
regulation, the solutions to these problems and review of the implementations of past solutions. 
This paper has identified a number of themes from these inquiries as to both problems and 
solutions for charity regulation. The author awaits in hope that the forthcoming Industry 
Commission Inquiry will tackle the hard issues such as the definition of charity, the systemic 
regulatory default, an appropriate theoretical framework for analysing the regulation of charity 
and rigorous collection of data to guide informed public policy decisions.  Even if the 
Commission does its job, will government do it? 
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